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Abstract
This paper explores the consequences of imperfect competition on capital
accumulation. The framework is an OLG growth model with altruistic agents.
Two types of long run equilibria exist: egoistic or altruistic. We assume
both competitive and non-competitive rms exist, the latter being endowed
with more productive technology. They behave strategically on the labor
market: they take into account the impact of their demand for labor on
the equilibrium wage and on their prot. The e¤ect of technical progress
for a non-competitive rm depends on the initial productivity of the rm
and on the type of steady state (egoistic or altruistic). An increase in the
productivity of the most productive rm has a negative impact on capital
accumulation in an egoistic steady state, and a positive one in an altruistic
steady state. An increase in the productivity of the competitive sector can
have various e¤ects on capital accumulation. If the productivity levels of
the non-competitive rms are close enough, capital accumulation increases in
an egoistic steady state and decreases in an altruistic one. But, the impact
of increasing productivity in the competitive sector can be reversed if the
productivity of the less productive non-competitive rm is low enough.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores the consequences of imperfect competition on capital accumu-
lation. We consider an economy populated by rms producing the same good and
endowed with technologies that di¤er by their productivity. In a perfectly competi-
tive economy, only the rm endowed with the most productive technology would be
active. But the assumption of perfect competition becomes meaningless if only one
rm (or a small number of rms) remains on the market. Therefore, the assump-
tion of imperfect competition is natural for an economy populated by heterogeneous
rms. We assume that the most productive rms realize that they hold some market
power on the labor market, and take into account the impact of their demand for
labor on wages. We thus obtain an equilibrium with strategic behavior in the labor
market.
In an imperfect competition framework, technical progress a¤ecting some rms
may lead to new features. First, this higher productivity increases the monopsony
power of the innovating rms with respect to other rms. By this e¤ect, the distri-
bution of income between labor and capital may change. Second, these changes in
income distribution may lead to changes in capital accumulation. The direct e¤ect
of a technical progress is to increase capital accumulation. But, imperfect competi-
tion leads to indirect e¤ects that may go in the same or in the opposite direction.
Therefore, technical progress may have paradoxical e¤ects on capital accumulation
through imperfect competition.
The main assumptions of the model are the following. We assume that the
single good of the economy is produced using capital and labor by di¤erent types
of rms. First, competitive rms exist which all use the same basic Cobb-Douglas
technology with constant returns. For a xed (predetermined) level of capital, their
competitive labor demand is a decreasing function of the real wage. Second, there
exist m  1 non-competitive rms using their own technology that di¤ers from the
basic technology by having higher total factor productivity. This higher productivity
can result from a past innovation process, and is exogenous. Moreover, we generally
assume in this paper, for the sake of simplicity, that this production structure is
identical in all periods. Non-competitive rms behave as an oligopsony on the labor
market: they take into account the impact of their labor demand on the equilibrium
wage and on their prots1. They play a Cournot-Nash game among themselves.
This production sector is part of a growth model with overlapping generations.
The capital stock of each rm results from agents investments in the preceding
period. As agents can arbitrate between returns provided by di¤erent rms, all cap-
ital returns must be equal at equilibrium. This last condition added to equilibrium
conditions of the Cournot-Walras game allow an equilibrium to be dened in which
the shares of capital and labor used by each rm are endogenous.
We assume that agents are altruistic (as in Barro (1974) and Weil (1987)) and
we focus on the long run steady state of the economy. It is well known that two
1The article of Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002) gives many arguments in favor of the assump-
tion of oligopsony competition in labor markets.
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types of steady state may exist, depending on whether bequest is operative or not.
Moreover, we assume a logarithmic instantaneous utility function. These assump-
tions have particular consequences on capital accumulation. In an egoistic steady
state (without bequest), capital accumulation only depends on the equilibrium wage
of the economy, as only labor earnings are saved. In contrast, in an altruistic steady
state (with positive bequest), capital accumulation only depends on the rate of re-
turn of capital. The non-competitive behavior of some rms tends to decrease the
equilibrium wage of the economy and to increase the rate of return of capital. There-
fore, such behavior is detrimental to capital accumulation in an egoistic steady state
and benecial in an altruistic one.
In this framework, we study the impact on long run capital accumulation of an
exogenous technical progress that a¤ects one non-competitive rm, or the compet-
itive sector. As a benchmark, it is worth noting that in a perfectly competitive
economy, an increase in productivity always gives rise to an increase in capital ac-
cumulation.
Considering a non-competitive rm, it is proved that the impact of technical
progress depends on the initial productivity of the rm and on the type of steady
state (egoistic or altruistic). First, it should be note that the increase in produc-
tivity of a non-competitive rm has opposing e¤ects on factors remuneration at
equilibrium: if the equilibrium wage increases, the rate of return decreases and vice
versa. Therefore, if capital accumulation increases for an egoistic steady state, it
will decrease for an altruistic one and vice versa. Second, an increase of one rms
productivity can have various consequences on factor remunerations, since it induces
two e¤ects. The direct e¤ect is that the rm reduces the quantity of labor it uses
per unit of capital. This e¤ect tends to decrease the equilibrium value of the wage
and to increase the capital return. The indirect e¤ect is that the rm at equilibrium
holds a higher share of the total capital of the economy. It acts in the same way
as the rst one, if the rm that benets from the technical progress is initially the
most productive one. But it acts in the opposing direction if the rm that benets
from this productivity increase is not initially the most productive one. The sec-
ond e¤ect may be dominant, particularly, for the less-productive non-competitive
rm: an increase of its productivity can rise the equilibrium wage and decreases the
capital return.
We consider now the impact on accumulation of an increase of productivity in
the competitive sector. If the productivity levels of the non-competitive rms are
close enough, we show that capital accumulation increases for an egoistic steady
state and decreases for an altruistic one. This e¤ect results from the increase of
the wage and the decrease in the capital return. But, we show that the impact of
increasing productivity in the competitive sector can be reversed if the productivity
of the less-productive non-competitive rm is low enough.
From these results, it appears that technical progress may have paradoxical ef-
fects on capital accumulation through imperfect competition.
These results can be understood through comparison with existing literature.
Indeed, our model can be viewed as the symmetrical to Sorgers (2002) and Beckers
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(2003) contributions. In these articles, rms are perfectly competitive and consumers
behave non-competitively in the capital market. In our model, consumers are per-
fectly competitive and some rms behave non-competitively in the labor market.
In Sorger and Becker, a long run equilibrium exists in which consumers endowed
with di¤erent rates of time preference hold positive amounts of capital. This result
is in contrast with the competitive economy, in which only the most patient agent
holds capital in the long run. In our contribution, a long run equilibrium exists in
which rms endowed with di¤erent productivity levels are productive, while only
the most productive ones would be active in a competitive setting. In both cases,
the interpretation is the same: through his/her non-competitive behavior, an agent
increases his/her gain, but it exerts a positive inuence on the gain of other players.
And agents who have the lowest market power are those who benet the most from
the non-competitive behavior of other agents. Therefore, all agents may remain in
the market.
In Sorger and Becker, consumers endowed with the lowest rate of time preference
have the greatest market power. They underinvest in capital in order to increase
the rate of interest. But this behavior increases the gain of all other agents, and
particularly the gain of agents who exercise "more competitive" behavior. In our
framework, the most productive rms have stronger market power. They employ less
labor for a given quantity of capital in order to diminish the equilibrium wage. But
this behavior is benecial to less-productive rms who employ more labor. Their
lower technical progress is balanced by their higher demand of labor which increases
their capital productivity.
The imperfect competition mechanism that we introduce in this paper can also be
viewed in the line of Cournot-Walras equilibrium (cf. Gabszewicz and Vial (1972),
Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993) and Gabszewicz and Michel (1997)). Following
this concept, some agents, having a signicant size compared to the whole economy,
take into account the inuence of their action on the equilibrium. A Walrasian
equilibrium is formed which depends on the quantities chosen by the strategic agents
who play a game of the Cournot-Nash type between themselves. Recent papers
have used this concept in various frameworks. Belan, Michel and Wigniolle (2002)
show that it can be fruitful to interpret pension funds behavior. Belan, Michel and
Wigniolle (2005) wonder if imperfect competition can foster capital accumulation in
a developing economy.
In the last part of the paper, a simple extension of the model is considered,
which allows an evolving production structure to be studied. In each period, one
rm may receive an innovation that increases its productivity by some given factor
with respect to the common technology. These events occur at random and can be
interpreted as the appearance of an innovation. The innovating rm has an exclusive
use of its new technology during one period. In the next period, all rms benet
from the preceding innovation that becomes freely available. Therefore, there is one
non-competitive rm in each period in which an innovation occurs, and there is no
non-competitive rm in periods without innovation. In this framework, we study the
dynamics of an egoistic equilibrium. We show that the occurrence of an innovation
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has a negative short run impact on the growth rate, because imperfect competition
decreases the equilibrium wage. But, after one period, the e¤ect is positive as the
technology is available for the competitive sector.
This simple model shows that a technical progress can have two paradoxical
e¤ects in the short run: rst, it can cause a fall in capital accumulation; second,
it can increase the share of GDP devoted to capital income and decrease the share
devoted to labor income. These two e¤ects result from the non-competitive behavior
of innovating rms. Therefore, our model may provide an interpretation for two
stylized facts that have been extensively discussed in recent literature. The rst one is
the Solows paradox: from the eighties, numerous authors mention that innovations
associated with computers and information technologies have not been associated
with a signicant jump in GDP growth rates (see for instance Solow (1987) and
David (1990)). The second one is the fall of the share of GDP devoted to labor
income and the jump of the share devoted to capital income that some Western
countries have experienced from the seventies. For instance, in France between 1980
and 2000, the share of GDP devoted to labor income has experienced a fall from 72%
to 60%2 ((see for instance Askenazy (2003)). In our framework, these two stylized
facts can be interpreted as the consequence of an increased monopsony power for
innovating rms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the game played by non-
competitive rms. Section 3 studies householdsbehavior. Section 4 presents the
intertemporal long run equilibrium. Section 5 analyses the impact of an exogenous
technical change on capital accumulation. Section 6 concludes. The most complex
proofs are given in the appendix.
2 The productive sector
Two types of rms exist in the productive sector: competitive and non-competitive.
We rst introduce an equilibrium concept in which non-competitive rms behave as
an oligopsony on the labor market: they take into account the impact of their labor
demand on the equilibrium wage and on their prots. Second, the existence of an
equilibrium of the game is proved. Third, the consequences of imperfect competition
on equilibrium prices are studied.
2.1 Denition of the equilibrium concept
We consider an imperfect competition concept in the line of the Cournot-Walras
equilibrium. At each period t occurs a game consisting of three steps. In a rst step,
households allocate their savings between the di¤erent rms, arbitrating between the
di¤erent capital returns. At the second step, the non-competitive rms choose their
labor demand (their strategic variable). In the third step, an equilibrium occurs on
the labor market that determines the equilibrium wage.
2During the same time, this share experiences oscillations in the US between 69 and 65 percent
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We now make precise the assumptions regarding the productive sector.
Firms employ capital and labor. Capital depreciates fully in one period. There
exist two types of rms: competitive and non-competitive. Competitive rms have
the same Cobb-Douglas technology given by:
F (K0;t; L0;t) = A0K

0;tL
1 
0;t
Without loss of generality, it is possible to consider only one competitive rm, and
we denote by K0;t and L0;t its amounts of capital and labor.
There exist m non-competitive rms respectively endowed with Cobb-Douglas
production technologies given by:
for i = 1; :::m; AiKi;tL
1 
i;t
We assume the following inequalities:
A0 < A1 < ::::: < Am
Non-competitive rms have a higher total factor productivity than competitive rms.
This higher productivity may result for instance from past innovations. We will
assume along the rst part of the paper that this production structure is identical
in all periods.
At the beginning of period t; the total amount of capital Kt is allocated by
households among the di¤erent rms. This capital stock results from period t   1
savings behavior and for the moment, Kt is assumed to be given3. In period t;
the households who hold the capital stock of rm i (0  i  m) share the prot
according to their capital contribution. The resulting payo¤ per unit of capital for
them is:
Ri;t =
AiK

i;tL
1 
i;t   wtLi;t
Ki;t
(1)
We assume that households are atomistic and behave competitively. They take Ri;t
as given and invest their savings in rms providing the highest returns Ri;t:
Using these assumptions, the three steps of the game are the following.
1. At the beginning of period t; consumers allocate their savings Kt among the
di¤erent rms i; 0  i  m : Kt = K0;t +
mX
i=1
Ki;t:
2. Their capital stock being installed, the m non-competitive rms choose their
labor demand (L1;t; ::Li;t; :::Lm;t) ; such that
mX
i=1
Li;t  Nt (2)
3Householdssavings behavior is described in section 3.
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3. There is an equilibrium on the labor market. This equilibrium is reached when
the competitive labor demand of rm 0 is equal to the remaining quantity of
labor after the decision of non-competitive rms, or
wt = A0(1  )K0;t
 
Nt  
mX
i=1
Li;t
! 
As it is usual in Cournot-Walras competition, the strategies of non-competitive
rms are constrained by (2) in such a way that an equilibrium exists. By assumption,
rms i with 1  i  m are the only strategic agents. Firm 0 and consumers behave
competitively.
The game is solved by backward induction.
From step 3, the equilibrium condition on the labor market denes the equi-
librium wage as a function of the demand of labor by non-competitive rms Li;t,
i = 1; :::;m:
wt = A0(1  )K0;t
 
Nt  
mX
i=1
Li;t
! 
 !t (L1;t; :::; Lm;t) (3)
From step 2, each non-competitive rm imaximizes its prot, taking into account
the impact of its labor demand on the equilibrium wage:
max
Li;t
AiK

i;tL
1 
i;t   !t (L1;t; :::; Lm;t)Li;t (4)
The optimal choice of Li;t is such that4:
(1  )AiKi;tL i;t   (1  )A0K0;tL 0;t   (1  )A0K0;tLi;tL  10;t = 0 (5)
The third term of this equation stems from the non-competitive behavior.
Finally, from step 1, all capital returns must be equal:
8i = 1; :::;m; AiK

i;tL
1 
i;t   wtLi;t
Ki;t
=
A0K

0;tL
1 
0;t   wtL0;t
K0;t
= A0K
 1
0;t L
1 
0;t (6)
and the total capital stock is shared between all rms:
K0;t +
mX
i=1
Ki;t = Kt (7)
4The concavity of the prot function with respect to Li;t is satised, as the second derivative
is negative:
 (1  )AiKi;tL  1i;t   2(1  )A0K0;tL  10;t   (1  )(1 + )A0K0;tLi;tL  20;t > 0:
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In order to characterize the equilibrium of the game, it is convenient to introduce
the following notations: qi = Ai=A0; li;t = Li;t=Ki;t; i;t = li;t=l0;t; pi;t = Ki;t=Kt and
~pi;t = pi;t=p0;t:
Equation (5) can be written:
Ail
 
i;t   A0l 0;t   A0
Ki;t
K0;t
li;tl
  1
0;t = 0
Dividing by A0l 0;t we obtain:
qi
 
i;t   1  ~pi;ti;t = 0 (8)
The equality of capital returns for each rm (6) denes the gross return on
savings Rt:
Rt  A0l1 0;t = Ail1 i;t   A0(1  )l 0;t li;t (9)
Dividing by A0l 0;t we obtain the equation:
qi
1 
i;t   (1  )i;t =  (10)
Finally, the allocation of total capital on the di¤erent rms (7) leads to:
p0;t +
mX
i=1
pi;t = 1
or:
p0;t
 
1 +
mX
i=1
~pi;t
!
= 1 (11)
Equations (8), (10) and (11) allow to characterize the equilibrium of the game.
2.2 Existence of the equilibrium between non-competitive
rms
In this section, we prove that our equilibrium concept leads to a unique equilibrium,
and we describe its properties. We rst remark that (8), (10) and (11) dene a
system of 2m + 1 equations for 2m + 1 variables, and that these equations do not
depend on the period t: Consequently, 8i = 1; :::;m; i;t; ~pi;t and p0;t are constant
variables, that we will write further i; ~pi and p0:
From equation (8), we obtain that i is such that: qi
 
i > 1; or i < (qi)
1= :
Equation (10) has a unique solution i such that i < (qi)
1= ; and this solution
denes i as a decreasing function of qi: Moreover, as qi
 
i > 1; (10) implies that:
i   (1  )i    < iqi i   (1  )i    = 0
Thus,
i < 1
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We have nally proved that all non-competitive rms have a smaller labor-capital ra-
tio than the ratio in the competitive sector. The more productive a non-competitive
rm is, the smaller its labor-capital ratio is, as i is a decreasing function of qi. This
property results from the higher market power of the more productive rms: they
reduce their labor demand in order to decrease the equilibrium wage.
As for all i = 1; :::;m; i is well-dened, we deduce from (8) the value of ~pi;
8i = 1; :::;m :
~pi =
qi
 
i   1
i
which is an increasing function of qi:
Finally p0 is given by (11), and is a decreasing function of qi: The share of capital
held by rm i pi is given by:
pi = p0~pi =
~pi
1 +
mX
j=1
~pj
which is an increasing function of ~pi; and therefore an increasing function of qi:
We have nally proved that, for each value of total capital, there exists a non-
competitive equilibrium in which all rms are productive. The higher the productiv-
ity of a rm is, the higher the share of capital that it employs at equilibrium is and
the lower its labor-capital ratio will be. It is worth noting that, in an equilibrium
with perfect competition, only the most productive rm would be active. With im-
perfect competition, the more productive rms strategically diminishes their labor
demand to decrease the equilibrium wage. This behavior exerts a positive external-
ity on less productive rms, which employ a higher labor-capital ratio, and which
can attain the same level of capital productivity.
2.3 Equilibrium prices
At period t; Kt being the total capital stock and Nt the number of young people, it
is possible to determine the equilibrium level of the wage wt and the gross interest
rate Rt:
From the labor market equilibrium, we have:
Nt =
mX
i=0
Li;t =
mX
i=0
li;tpiKt
Nt = l0;tp0Kt
"
1 +
mX
i=1
i~pi
#
Finally, with kt = Kt=Nt denoting the ratio of capital per young agent, we obtain
from (11):
l 10;t = ktX
with X =
1 +
Pm
i=1 i~pi
1 +
Pm
i=1 ~pi
9
In an economy with perfect competition, we would obtain X = 1: In our economy
with imperfect competition, we have X < 1 as i < 1: For the competitive rm, the
equilibrium labor-capital ratio l0;t is higher than its value for a perfectly competitive
economy 1=kt:
We can then deduce the values of the equilibrium wage (3) and gross interest
rate (9):
wt = (1  )A0l 0;t = (1  )A0kt X (12)
Rt = A0l
1 
0;t = A0k
 1
t X
 1 (13)
In these two equations, the variable X results from imperfect competition. As
X < 1; we see that imperfect competition tends to decrease the equilibrium wage,
and to increase the gross interest rate, with respect to the case of perfect competition
with the less productive technology.
3 Householdsbehavior
The production sector is part of a growth model with overlapping generations of
altruistic agents. The model is based on Diamond (1965) and Barro (1974)-Weil
(1987). Agents are living for two periods. The size of generation t is Nt and each
agent has (1 + n) children. We assume that parents care about their childrens
welfare by weighting their childrens utility in their own utility function. The utility
of a generation born at time t, Vt, is given by
Vt = U(ct; dt+1) + Vt+1; 0 <  < 1
with U(ct; dt+1) = (1  a) ln(ct) + a ln(dt+1)
ct and dt+1 respectively denote rst period and second period consumptions. In their
rst period of life, individuals born in t work and receive a wage wt. In addition to
their wage income, they receive a bequest xt from their parents. They consume ct
and save an amount st: Gross returns on savings are equal to Rt+1 : at equilibrium,
all rms provide the same return on capital. In their second period of life, people
receive returns on savings and allocate net resources between consumption dt+1 and
bequests xt+1 to their (1 + n) children. Thus
xt + wt = ct + st (14)
Rt+1st = dt+1 + (1 + n)xt+1 (15)
Bequests must be non-negative :
xt+1  0 (16)
The maximum of total utility is given by the following recursive relation:
V t (xt) = max
ct;st;dt+1;xt+1

U(ct; dt+1) + V

t+1(xt+1)
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subject to (14), (15) and (16).
For any positive t, V t (xt) represents the maximum utility of a young agent
born in t when he inherits xt. These are the value functions of the innite horizon
problems max
P+1
j=0 
jU(ct+j; dt+j+1) subject to (14), (15) and (16).
This maximization problem leads to the following rst-order conditions
U
0
c(ct; dt+1) = Rt+1U
0
d(ct; dt+1) (17)
 (1 + n)U 0d(ct; dt+1) + U
0
c(ct+1; dt+2)  0 (18)
The second condition holds with equality if xt+1 > 0. Equation (17) is the standard
condition for individual life-cycle allocation. Condition (18) is a condition for opti-
mal allocation between parent and children. If xt+1 > 0, it states that the marginal
utility loss from reduction of a parents consumption will equal the marginal utility
gain of an increase in the bequest.
When bequests are constrained at all periods (8t; xt = 0), equation (17) with a
log-linear utility function leads to the simple saving function:
st = awt (19)
In the long run, the economy reaches a steady state that is called egoistic long run
equilibrium.
When bequests are positive, it is well known that the economy converges towards
the modied golden rule steady state:
R =
1 + n

(20)
We call altruistic long run equilibrium this steady state.
The equilibrium values of prices w and R will depend on the equilibrium between
non-competitive rms.
4 The intertemporal long run equilibrium
Two types of long run intertemporal equilibria may exist: an altruistic equilibrium
with operative bequest (x > 0) and an egoistic equilibrium (x = 0).
At an altruistic long run equilibrium, the capital per young agent ratio kt con-
verges towards a value k; which is determined by (13) and by the modied golden
rule (20):
R = A0k
 1X 1 =
1 + n

or:
k =


1 + n
 1
1  (A0)
1
1 
X
(21)
Along an egoistic long run equilibrium, the capital per young agent ratio kt
converges toward a value k; which is determined by (12) and by the savings behavior
of the agents (19):
(1 + n)k = aw
11
or:
k =

(1  )a
1 + n
 1
1 
(A0)
1
1  (X)

1  (22)
In both equations (21) and (22) the impact of imperfect competition on capital
accumulation results from the variable X < 1: Within an altruistic steady state,
capital accumulation in the long run only depends on the return of capital. As
imperfect competition tends to increase the gross interest rate, the capital per young
agent ratio k is higher than under perfect competition. In contrast, within an egoistic
steady state, capital accumulation in the long run only depends on savings that only
depend on the equilibrium wage for a log-linear utility function. Thus, as imperfect
competition tends to decrease the equilibrium wage, the capital per young agent
ratio k is smaller than under perfect competition.
It is straightforward to show that the condition ensuring positive bequests in
Weil (1987) remains the same in our framework. The steady state will be altruistic
if k > k: This inequality gives the following condition:
(1  )aX < 
As X is smaller than 1; this condition shows that the existence of an altruistic
steady state is furthered by imperfect competition. This property was expected as
imperfect competition tends to increase the return to capital .
5 Technical progress and capital accumulation
In this section, we study how technical progress (i.e. an increase of some Ai; i =
0; ::::;m) modies capital accumulation in the long run.
5.1 Increasing productivity of a non-competitive rm
We rst study the impact of an increase of some Ai; i  1: This is equivalent to
consider that some qi increases, for i  1: Such technical progress will a¤ect capital
accumulation through the variable X: It is worth noting that X has an opposite
e¤ect on the two types of steady states, altruistic or egoistic. An increase of X
diminishes k and rises k:
As a benchmark, we know that a technical progress in a competitive economy
always increases capital accumulation, in both types of long run equilibria.
Proposition 1 it is possible to dene some increasing function (q) with (1) = 0;
such that, for each qi; i = 1; ::::;m; the interval Ki = (1; qi + (qi)) satises:
1. If for all j 6= i; qj 2 Ki; @X@qi < 0: An increase of qi rises k and diminishes k:
2. If for all j 6= i; qj =2 Ki; @X@qi > 0: An increase of qi diminishes k and raises k:
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Corollary 1 1. For i = m; as all qj 2 Km; we have @X@qm < 0: An increase of qm
raises k and diminishes k:
2. q1 is the only variable that can satisfy point 2 of proposition (1). Particularly,
if q1 is su¢ ciently small, (q1 tends toward 1), @X@q1 > 0: An increase of q1
diminishes k and raises k:
These results show that a technical progress can have various e¤ects on capital
accumulation. The rst case is obtained when all rms j have a productivity pa-
rameter qj close to qi (close in the sense that qj 2 (1; qi + (qi))). The second case
is obtained when q1 is su¢ ciently small with respect to q2; q3; :::qm: Therefore, the
impact of a technical progress on capital accumulation depends on two components:
on the initial productivity of the rm experiencing a technical progress with respect
to other rms, and on the type of long-run equilibrium - egoistic or altruistic.
This latter component can be understood, having in mind that the rise of pro-
ductivity of a non-competitive rm has opposite e¤ects on factors remuneration at
equilibrium: if the equilibrium wage increases, the rate of return decreases and vice
versa. Therefore, if capital accumulation increases for an egoistic steady state, it
will decrease for an altruistic one and conversely.
The former component can be explained, as an increase of one rms productivity
leads to two opposite e¤ects. First, the rm reduces the quantity of labor used per
unit of capital. This e¤ect tends to decrease the equilibrium value of the wage
and to increase the capital return. Second, since all capital returns are equal at
equilibrium, the rm holds a higher share of the total capital of the economy. If the
rm that benets from this productivity increase is the most productive (i = m),
this second e¤ect acts in the same sense as the rst one. Therefore, the equilibrium
wage decreases and the capital return increases, which decreases accumulation for an
egoistic steady state and increases accumulation for an altruistic one. But, if the rm
that benets from this productivity increase is not the most productive one (i < m),
the second e¤ect acts in opposite direction to the rst one, and the global e¤ect is
ambiguous. Particularly, it is proved that for the less productive non-competitive
rm, it is possible that a rise in its productivity increases the equilibrium wage and
decreases the capital return.
5.2 Increasing productivity in the competitive sector
We study the impact of an increase of A0 on both types of stationary equilibrium
k and k: From (21) and (22), A0 has a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect via the
variable X: Indeed, increasing A0 implies a decrease for all qi, i  1:
The following proposition shows that an increase of A0 can have various e¤ects
on capital accumulation.
Proposition 2 1. When qm ! +1; d ln kdA0 ! 1A0(1 ) and d ln
k
dA0
! 0:
2. When q1 ! 1; d ln kdA0 !  1 and d ln
k
dA0
! +1:
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3. When 8i  1; qi = q, d ln kdA0 > 0 and d ln
k
dA0
< 0: By continuity, these properties
hold when the qi; i  1; are su¢ ciently close together.
These results show that when the total factor productivities of non-competitive
rms are close, an increase of A0 tends to increase capital accumulation in an egoistic
steady state, and to decrease capital accumulation in an altruistic steady state. This
e¤ect results from the increase of the wage and the decrease of the capital return.
In contrast, the results may be reversed when the total factor productivities of non-
competitive rms are distant.
These properties can be interpreted as follows. The direct e¤ect of an increase
of the productivity in the non-competitive sector is a rise of both wage and capital
returns. But an indirect e¤ect stems from the fall of the relative productivity of
all non-competitive rms, which modify their market power. If non-competitive
rms have close productivities (case 3), the productivity increase in the competitive
sector implies a fall in the market power of all non-competitive rms, which causes
an increase of wages and a decrease of capital returns. If non-competitive rms have
distant productivities (cases 1 and 2), the productivity increase in the competitive
sector redistributes market power in favor of the most productive rms, and to the
detriment of the less productive ones. The resulting e¤ect on capital accumulation
may be reversed with respect to case 3.
5.3 Growth with random innovations
In this last section, we provide a simple extension of the model, introducing random
innovations. We assume that at each period, with a probability ; one rm receives
an innovation (and with probability 1  ; no innovation occurs in the whole econ-
omy). This innovation increases the productivity by a factor  > 1; with respect
to the common technology. Finally, each innovator has an exclusive use of its new
technology during only one period. After that period, there is free access to this
technology.
From the preceding assumptions, at each period t; either the economy is purely
competitive and the common productivity is A0;t; or one non-competitive rm has
a productivity level A1;t = A0;t while the other rms are competitive with the
common productivity A0;t:
We only consider the egoistic equilibrium in this part, as we want to analyze the
dynamics of capital accumulation. We use the expression of X given by equation
(23), that has been proved in appendix 1, setting x = 1=: The dynamics of kt with
random innovations is:
(1 + n)kt+1 = a(1  )A0;tkt Xt
With probability  (arrival of an innovation in t)
Xt =
x
1 + x(x  1)
with x > 1 the solution of  = x1  + (1  )x 
A0;t+1 = A0;t
14
With probability 1   (no innovation in t)
Xt = 1
A0;t+1 = A0;t
As x > 1; we have x
1+x(x 1) < 1: The arrival of an innovation has a negative
short run e¤ect on the growth rate, because imperfect competition decreases the
equilibrium wage. But, after one period, the e¤ect is positive as the technology is
available for the competitive sector. The greater the size of the innovation  is, the
larger both short run and long run e¤ects will be.
This simple example shows that a technical progress can have a negative short
run impact on growth, associated with a fall of wages and an increase of capital
returns. All these facts results from the increase in the monopsony power of the
innovating rm. This model could provide an interpretation for some stylized facts
that have been extensively discussed in recent literature. More precisely, two stylized
facts could be interpreted (partially) with our model. First, from the eighties, nu-
merous authors mention that innovations associated with computers and information
technologies have not been associated with a signicant jump in GDP growth rates,
or that their impact on productivity has been delayed. This idea is become very
popular under the name of Solows paradox (see Solow (1987) and David (1990)).
Second, from the seventies, some western countries have experienced a fall of the
share of GDP devoted to labor income and a jump of the share devoted to capi-
tal income. In our framework, these two stylized facts can be interpreted as the
consequence of an increased monopsony power for innovating rms.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied how long run growth can be a¤ected by strategic behavior of
rms in the labor market. The main results show the paradoxical e¤ects associated
with imperfect competition: a technical progress may decrease capital accumulation
if it leads to distortions due to imperfect competition.
Our work could lead to further developments, mostly in endogenizing the techni-
cal progress by an explicit innovative activity of the rms. Growth models in which
innovation is the source of growth are natural frameworks to develop our analysis,
since they make endogenous productivity di¤erences of rms.
Appendix 1: proof of proposition 1
We study the impact of an increase of qi on X; dened by
X =
1 +
Pm
j=1 j ~pj
1 +
Pm
j=1 ~pj
From (8), we have:
~pj =
qj
 
j   1
j
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From (10), we have:
qj
 
j = (1  ) +

j
Thus, we obtain,
~pj =
1
j

1
j
  1

We dene for each j; xj = 1=j. It is then possible to write
X =
1 +
mP
j=1
(xj   1)
1 +
mP
j=1
xj (xj   1)
(23)
By denition of xj and from equation (10), xj is the solution greater than 1 of the
equation:
qi = x
1 
i + (1  )x i
Therefore, xj increases with qj and we have 1 < x1 < ::::: < xm:
Computing the derivation @X
@xi
; its sign is the same as the sign of Z such that:
Z = 1 +
mX
j=1
xj (xj   1) 
"
1 +
X
j
(xj   1)
#
(2xi   1)
We take as given the value of xi; and we study Z as a function of xj; j 6= i: It is
possible to write:
Z = 1  x2i +
X
j 6=i
P (xj; xi)
with P (xj; xi) such that:
P (xj; xi) = x
2
j   xj   (2xi   1)(xj   1) = (xj   1)(xj   2xi + 1)
For a given xi; we study P (xj; xi) as a function of xj: This function is quadratic and
reaches its minimum in xj solution of @P (xj; xi)=@xj = 0; which gives
2xj   1  (2xi   1) = 0
or:
xj = xi
Thus Z reaches a minimum for xj = xi 8j 6= i; and the minimum value Zmin is:
Zmin = 1  x2i   (m  1)(xi   1)2 =  (xi   1) [m(xi   1) + 2] < 0
As all functions xj 7 ! P (xj; xi) are identical and symmetrical with respect to the
minimum reached in xj = xi; there exists an interval Ii = (xi   (xi); xi + (xi)) ;
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such that, if all xj are in Ii; then Z < 0; and if all xj =2 Ii; then Z > 0: (xi) is
dened by the property: if 8j 6= i; xj = xi  (xi); X = 0:
But, it is easy to see that the lower bound of the interval xi   (xi) is smaller
than 1: Indeed, for xj = 1 8j 6= i; we have X = 1   x2i < 0; which means that
xi   (xi) < 1: Thus, the relevant interval is in fact: Ji = (1; xi + (xi)) :
Finally, the value of (xi) is computed as the value of  solution of the equation:
X = 0 with 8j 6= i; xj = xi + : This leads to the equation:
2 =
mx2i   2(m  1)xi +m  2
m  1
which denes  as a function of xi :
(xi) =
s
mx2i   2(m  1)xi +m  2
m  1
The interval Ji = (1; xi + (xi)) implicitly denes an interval Ki on qi under the
form (1; qi + (qi)) : Indeed, equation (10) implicitly denes xi as a function of qi :
xi is the solution > 1 of the equation:
qi = x
1 
i + (1  )x i
We denote by  this function. xi = (qi) is an increasing (bijective) function from
[1;+1) on to [1;+1) :
We have:
@X
@qi
=
@X
@xi
dxi
dqi
with
dxi
dqi
= 0(xi) =
1
(1  )x 1 i (xi   1)
> 0
Therefore @X
@qi
and @X
@xi
have the same sign.
Finally, we obtain the interval Ki = (1; qi + (qi)) such that, for all qj in this
interval, @X
@qi
< 0: The function (qi) is dened as:
qi + (qi) = 
 1(xi)
with xi = (qi)
or:
qi + (qi) =  ((qi) + ((qi)))
1  + (1  ) ((qi) + ((qi))) 
Appendix 2: proof of proposition 2
We rst compute the expression of dxi
dA0
for all i:
As qi = Ai=A0; we have:
dqi
dA0
=   qi
A0
: From equation (10), xi is dened as a
function of qi; and we have:
dxi
dqi
=
1
(1  )x 1 i (xi   1)
17
Therefore,
dxi
dA0
=
dxi
dqi
dqi
dA0
=   qi
A0
1
(1  )x 1 i (xi   1)
and using equation (10) to eliminate qi; we obtain:
dxi
dA0
=
 1
(1  )A0
xi
xi   1(xi + 1  )
Second, we compute the expression of d lnX
dA0
; with X dened as a function of
(x1; ::::; xm):
X =
1 +
mP
j=1
(xj   1)
1 +
mP
j=1
xj (xj   1)
We obtain:
d lnX
dA0
=
1
(1  )A0
mX
i=1
xi(xi + 1  )
xi   1
"
(2xi   1)
 
1 +
mP
j=1
(xj   1)
!
 
 
1 +
mP
j=1
xj (xj   1)
!#
 
1 +
mP
j=1
xj (xj   1)
! 
1 +
mP
j=1
(xj   1)
!
From this formula, we have:
lim
xm!+1
d lnX
dA0
=
1
(1  )A0
lim
x1!1
d lnX
dA0
=  1
And, if we take xi = x 8i; we obtain:
d lnX
dA0
=
1
(1  )A0
mx(x+ 1  ) [m(x  1) + 2]
[1 +mx(x  1)] [1 +m(x  1)] (24)
Finally we have to consider the two stationary states.
For an altruistic steady state, the sign of d ln k
dA0
is given, from (21), by the sign of
1
(1  )A0  
d lnX
dA0
18
For an egoistic steady state, the sign of d ln k

dA0
is given, from (22), by the sign of
1
A0
+ 
d lnX
dA0
Items 1 and 2 of proposition 2 immediately follow from the preceding results.
The result d ln k

dA0
> 0 of point 3 is obtained as d lnX
dA0
> 0 from (24). Finally,
d ln k
dA0
< 0 is obtained in using (24) to calculate:
1
(1  )A0  
d lnX
dA0
=
1
(1  )A0

  mx(x+ 1  ) [m(x  1) + 2]
[1 +mx(x  1)] [1 +m(x  1)]

=
m2

x(1  x) mx2   2mx1 

 m+ 1
(1  )A0 [1 +mx(x  1)] [1 +m(x  1)]
In the last expression, the denominator is positive and the numerator is always
negative for x > 1 and m  1:
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